When your funding stack stops working, it often happens subtly and shows up as a set of symptoms that build. Anyone is worth a second look; more than one is a strong signal that a review is overdue.
| The sign | What it is usually telling you |
|---|---|
| Covenants tightening, or a breach looming | The structure has too little headroom for how the business now trades |
| A facility nearing maturity with no plan | Refinancing risk is building; act before the options narrow |
| A lender that cannot increase the line | You have outgrown the incumbent's appetite |
| Expensive CBILS or RLS-era debt | You are paying pandemic-era pricing in a different market |
| Several uncoordinated facilities | The stack has grown piecemeal and is due for consolidation |
| The wrong instrument for the job | A mismatch between the facility type and the need it funds |
| Debt service straining cash flow | Higher rates or the wrong repayment profile are squeezing the business |
| A recent decline from your bank | You need a view of the wider market, not just one lender |
Structuring debt is the work of deciding how a business's borrowing is put together: what types of facility it uses, in what amounts, at what cost, against what security, under what covenants, and over what maturities. It is not the same as simply borrowing money. Two businesses can owe the same total and yet be in completely different positions. One business can be held back by its structure, the other well served by it. What matters is how the pieces fit the business and each other.
For a scaling UK business, debt is rarely a single loan. It is usually a stack: an invoice finance or asset-based line funding working capital, perhaps a term or cash flow loan layered on top, sometimes legacy government-backed debt, alongside the owners' equity. Good structure is the arrangement of those layers so that the cost is sensible, the security given is proportionate, the covenants reflect how the business actually operates, the maturities do not all fall due at once, and there is headroom to grow.
The funding stack: how the layers of debt, hybrids and equity fit together. Higher layers rank ahead and cost less; lower layers rank behind and cost more.
Recognise more than one of these? An honest review will tell you whether your structure has drifted, and what it would cost to put right.
The single most useful idea to hold onto is alignment. The best structure is the one that matches the shape, the cash flows and the ambitions of the business as it is today. Poor structure is any arrangement where one or more of those have slipped out of line, for example, a term loan doing the job of a revolving facility, or covenants written for a smaller, riskier company than the one that now exists.
| Dimension | Well-structured debt | Poorly structured debt |
|---|---|---|
| Cost | Priced to the business's current risk | Still paying yesterday's, higher, margin |
| Security | Proportionate to the borrowing | Over-secured, or assets tied up needlessly |
| Covenants | Reflect how the business runs, with headroom | Written for a smaller, riskier company; tight |
| Maturities | Spread sensibly, with no cliff edge | Bunched, or a large facility maturing with no plan |
| Headroom | Room to fund the next phase | Maxed out, so growth is constrained |
| Fit | The right instrument for each need | The wrong instrument doing the job, such as a term loan funding working capital |
So why do stacks stop working? Because businesses change faster than their funding does, and two things drift after a facility is agreed upon. The first is the business itself: a company that has grown its earnings, improved its margins or built an asset base is a stronger credit than it was when it borrowed, and its needs change shape, so a structure that is not revisited falls behind. The second is the market and the wider environment: a great deal of mid-market debt was arranged in very different conditions, much of it priced and structured for the pandemic period, and since then, the Bank of England's base rate has risen sharply, lifting the cost of servicing debt and thinning interest cover. None of this reflects badly on the finance team. It is the natural consequence of a business growing faster than its funding.
The most common reason a stack stops fitting is simple: it was built for an earlier version of the business. The right capital structure at £2m of turnover, raising its first growth facility, looks nothing like the right structure at £15m, refinancing a tired stack. As a business scales, generates more predictable cash flow and builds an asset base, the mix that suited it changes, and a structure that is never revisited drifts out of step with the company it serves.
In practice, this shows up in a few recognisable ways: a facility or lender you have outgrown, whose line cannot scale with revenue; the wrong instrument doing a job it was never designed for, such as a term loan funding a working capital need that an asset-based or invoice line would serve better; or a single facility doing the work that a coordinated blend of facilities should.
The fix is to realign the structure with the stage the business is actually at, usually by reshaping the stack or refinancing into facilities that fit, often replacing one ill-fitting facility with a blend built from the right components. That might mean asset-based lending or a cash flow loan in place of a single stretched line, or working capital and growth capital facilities that match how the business runs. FBX arranges these alongside its refinance work, building the structure the business needs now rather than preserving the shape of the old one.
Two of the most common and most fixable problems are cost and timing.
On cost, the structure may simply be charging more than it should. A business that has strengthened since it borrowed is arguably entitled to a lower margin, but that repricing does not happen on its own, and legacy CBILS or RLS-era debt in particular was often priced for the pandemic period rather than for the business as it is now. Higher base rates have compounded the effect. The reassuring part is that the market has moved in borrowers' favour. Where a business once had a relationship bank and little else, funding now spans clearing banks, challenger and specialist banks, asset-based lenders, private credit and debt funds, and fintech lenders, each with a different appetite and price.
According to the British Business Bank's Small Business Finance Markets report, challenger and specialist banks accounted for 60% of gross SME bank lending in 2025, up from 39% in 2012, with challenger banks and non-bank lenders together providing more than two-thirds of all SME lending. That breadth is exactly why debt that felt fairly priced a couple of years ago may now be well off the pace.
On timing, a facility approaching maturity with no clear plan, or several maturities bunched together, is a problem in its own right. Refinancing ahead of a maturity, from a position of strength, almost always produces better terms than scrambling as the deadline arrives, because lenders price certainty and preparation.
Because an expensive or ill-timed structure usually still functions, the cost of leaving it tends to stay hidden, sometimes for years.
| The hidden cost | How it shows up |
|---|---|
| Overpaying on margin | Cash that could fund growth leaks out quietly, month after month |
| Lost headroom | Opportunities turned down or delayed because the facility cannot stretch |
| Covenant risk | An ordinary slow quarter becomes a breach and a difficult conversation |
| Opportunity cost | Management time spent managing a constrained structure, not running the business |
The most direct remedy for both cost and maturity is debt refinancing: replacing the facility, or the whole stack, with new borrowing on better terms. The strongest results come from preparing a clear, well-evidenced case and creating genuine competition between lenders rather than returning by default to the incumbent.
Case study
Sometimes the facility itself is fine, and the binding constraint is the financial covenants. Covenant pressure is one of the clearest signs that a structure has drifted, and also the one that frightens people most and needs to be addressed the least.
A covenant breach is technically an event of default, which is what makes it sound alarming. But an event of default gives the lender options rather than forcing a single outcome, and in the UK mid-market lenders very rarely enforce over a breach by an otherwise viable business. The usual outcome, especially where you engage early with a clear explanation and a plan, is a waiver or a reset of the covenant levels.
The useful thing is to diagnose which kind of breach you have. A one-off breach caused by a known, temporary event is a very different conversation from a structural breach that reflects covenants written for a smaller, riskier company than you are now. A one-off is usually resolved with a waiver. A structural problem points to resetting the covenants going forward or, where the facility no longer fits the business at all, refinancing into one whose terms reflect how the company actually operates. A recurring or structural breach is better read not as a sign the business is in trouble, but as a sign the structure is due for a review.
The word "restructuring" carries a distressed connotation that frightens many finance leaders unnecessarily, so it is worth drawing the line clearly, because which side of it you are on determines the kind of help you need.
On the solvent side sits the great majority of mid-market activity: a viable, trading business refinancing or reshaping its debt by agreement with its lenders, with no court involvement and no insolvency process. This is consensual corporate debt restructuring, and there are two broad routes back, which in practice often overlap.
| Route | What it involves | When it fits |
|---|---|---|
| Refinancing | Replacing a facility, or the whole stack, with new borrowing on better terms | The cost or structure is wrong, or a better-fitting lender exists |
| Reshaping the existing debt | Amend and extend, covenant resets, rescheduling, consolidation, or layering in new funding | The incumbent relationship is sound, but the terms need to change |
On the distressed side sit the formal, court-led processes: the statutory mechanisms used when a company cannot meet its obligations and cannot reach a consensual solution. These are led by licensed insolvency practitioners and restructuring lawyers, and reaching them is far less common than the word "restructuring" suggests. They are a backstop, not a starting point.
You do not always need a debt advisory and restructuring specialist to put your debt back into shape. A simple, like-for-like renewal with an incumbent that is happy and able to continue is often best handled directly, particularly by a business with a strong in-house treasury or an experienced CFO who keeps current market knowledge and good lender relationships. Where there is no real-time pressure and the requirement sits comfortably within the incumbent's appetite, the case for bringing in a specialist is weak, and an honest adviser will tell you so.
Often fine to handle in-house
A simple, like-for-like renewal with a willing incumbent
A strong treasury or CFO with current market knowledge
A small requirement within the incumbent's appetite
No real-time pressure, with plenty of runway
Where a specialist usually earns their place
Restructuring across several lenders at once
Refinancing under a looming maturity or covenant
Funding a transaction the current structure cannot support
Finding a route after the bank has declined to extend
The picture changes when the situation involves complexity, pressure, a transaction, or a genuine need to see across the whole market. Restructuring a stack across several lenders, refinancing under a looming maturity, funding an acquisition that the current structure cannot support, or finding a route after the bank has declined all reward someone who knows the full market and negotiates these deals for a living. The honest test is whether the situation is routine and within your team's reach, or whether it is the kind of thing your team does once every few years while a specialist does it every week.
Case study
A logistics management buyout FBX advised on shows the point. It needed a structure combining senior debt, equity and vendor loan notes, with the haulage fleet refinanced through a specialist lender to release the funding the deal required, the kind of multi-instrument transaction that is hard to run without someone who does it regularly. You can read the £2.4m management buyout in full.
Case study
In one example, a healthcare recruitment business came to us with an invoice discounting line that was quietly failing it, for reasons the team could not pin down. We refinanced the facility and persuaded the lender to add a growth loan on top. On the client's own comparison, the business ended up with roughly 50% more facility while paying around 15% less than before. The structure had not been broken beyond repair. It had simply stopped fitting, and the market had moved on without them.
Debt advisory and restructuring is the work of reviewing a business's borrowing and then raising, refinancing or reshaping it to fit the company, done independently of any single lender and across the whole UK market.
Debt refinancing means replacing existing borrowing with new borrowing on better terms, a lower cost, more headroom, a longer maturity, or a lender that can grow with the business.
Financial covenants are the conditions in a loan agreement that require a borrower to stay within agreed limits, usually tested quarterly against ratios like leverage and interest cover.
Corporate debt restructuring is reorganising a UK company's existing debt, its facilities, terms, pricing, security or lenders, so the borrowing fits the business as it is now.
Capital structure is the mix of debt, equity, and hybrid funding a business uses to finance growth and operations. The ideal structure balances cost, risk, flexibility, and ownership, using enough debt to lower funding costs without creating excessive financial strain.